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Abstract: This study examines the disjuncture between the policy transposition of the Liberal
Peace Project (LPP) in South Sudan from the country's local context. It underlines how deep
rooted historical exclusion from social welfare services reinforces political exclusion and exac-
erbates poor civic engagement among different ethnicities in the country causing a constant re-
lapse  to  violence. The study combines a qualitative  review of  data from Afrobarometer,  the
National Democratic Institute, international NGOs, and South Sudan's government reports with in-
depth interviews and participants' observation. The research finds that restricted access to formal
education alongside the conservative and orthodox approaches to peacebuilding, which broadly
focus on centralised urban political institutions and exclude diverse local needs and preferences,
limit citizenship participation to elections and preclude an equitable social order in South Sudan,
establishing a continuum of  fragile  authoritarian  peace,  institutional  peace and constitutional
peace. In an emancipatory approach, the study proposes a framework that prioritizes an ex-
tended access to primary and post-primary vocational education as a more credible establishment
for sustainable civil peace in the country. The LPP by the international community needs to be
tailored to enhance the political  will  of the South Sudan government to extend free primary
education access, incentivize primary education with school feeding programmes and to invig-
orate vocational training curricula. These will yield civil peace dividends, which avert South Sudan's
structural source of relapse into violence with sustainable disincentives. Apart from women's em-
powerment through education and in all spheres of life, the government needs to ensure sustain-
ability by guaranteeing a sustainable future for the present and for returning refugees by reducing
the effects of climate change so as to cope with the increasing pressure on natural resources.
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1. Introduction
The world's newest nation-the Republic of South Sudan
(RSS), is once again in prolonged international media
coverage,  and  has  been  since  15  December  2013.
Characteristic of her history, the potracted conflict over
socio-political  and  economic  marginalisation  by  the
Republic of Sudan of then South Sudan has resurfaced
in the RSS, ending not just the euphoria of its inde-
pendence from the Republic of Sudan on July 9, 2011
but also, crippling hopes for a politically inclusive state
with  an  equitable  social  order.  In  retrospect,  one  is
obliged to wonder whether the 2005 Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA), ending decades of civil conflict
against  the  people  of  South  Sudan  and  subsequent
peacebuilding attempts in the post independence fed-
eral,  presidential  democratic  RSS, are apt enough to
yield sustainable civil peace. Peacebuilding or the Lib-
eral  Peace  Project  connotes  the  processes  aimed at
reviving the  state's  capacity  to  identify,  support  and
strengthen her socio-political and economic structures
in  view  of  averting  structural  factors  that  cause  or
nurture a relapse into violent conflict [1,2]. However,
the LPP in RSS has evidently failed and the country is
back to war, echoing a political power tussle with ethnic
undertones opposing the majority Dinka of president
Silva Kiir and his ex-deputy Riek Machar from the Nuer
ethnicity. Empirical evidence suggests a concentration
of civil wars in countries with little education like the
RSS. Conversely, in a country with a higher proportion
of its youth in school, the risk of conflict is significantly
reduced [3‒6].
2. Aim and Method
This  paper examines the mismatch between peace-
building  and  locally  felt  needs  of  conflict  resulting
from the LPP in the RSS. The crux of the argument is
that  the  lack  of  formal  education  opportunities  con-
stitutes a structural source of relapse to conflict in South
Sudan.  Consequently, the consolidation of democratic
institutions, modelled on the conservative and orthodox
approaches to peacebuilding that characterize the cur-
rent practices of the LPP in the country does not target
the  root  causes  of  violence  and  its  recurrence. The
paper concludes that the prioritization and provisioning
of  formal  education  opportunities  is  justifiable  and
would serve to attain the LPP objectives of civil peace.
The  paper  underlines  the  fact  that  though  the
emancipatory  approach  of  the  LPP—the  bedrock  of
international  peacebuilding  initiatives  is  highly  con-
sidered of  theoretical  and  impracticable  value  [7],  it
could operationalize the approach through institutions
of primary and post-primary vocational education. The
study highlights  the need to  accomplish meaningful
social, political and economic inclusion of a population
easily  induced  to  violence  in  South  Sudan's  peace-
building process through increased access to primary
education and post primary vocational training as an
urgent policy implementation option that would disin-
centivize recourse to violence and rather induce du-
rable or civil peace.
The study made use of bottom-up (felt needs) and a
top-down  methods  that  underpin  the  emancipatory
approach of the LPP. It involves substantial, qualitative,
desk research that reviewed reports, surveys and doc-
uments  of  peacebuilding  stakeholders  (civil  society
organizations,  bilateral  aid  donors,  multilateral  peace
agencies)  and  the  national  government  of  South
Sudan.  Individual  in-depth interviews and participant
observation were also used to abduce information from
stakeholders.
3. Background: Agitation and Resistance from 
Social and Political Exclusion
Sudan's history is characterized by a specter of unending
civil wars that has significantly affected Southern Sudan,
accounting for the relapse to conflict in the new country.
Sudan, from which South Sudan gained independence
suffered two major civil strifes between 1955 and 1972
and from 1982 to present. This 'long history of political
vulnerability and exclusion' ([8] p. 1) disproportionately
affected  Southern  Sudan.  During  the  Anglo-Egyptian
condominium  (1899–1934)  the  British  imperial  gov-
ernment,  and  later  the  ruling  northern  elites,  used
education  as  a  tool  for  the  perpetuation  of  socio-
economic and political marginalization of both majority
rural communities and Southern Sudan in particular. The
British 'Northern policy' encouraged and perpetuated the
socio-economic exclusion and marginalization of Sudan
at  the  detriment  of  the  then  Southern  Sudan.  They
modernized the economy and infrastructure of the north
while Christian missionaries provided the much needed
'moral guidance' rather than economic development in
the Southern Sudan. This 'Northern policy' did set the
stage for political vulnerability and exclusion of Southern
Sudanese.
In  a  glimpse  of  recognition  of  the  problems  of
Southern Sudan in the time of the Anglo-Egyptian Con-
dominium, Britain passed the 'Closed District Order' of
1922. This Order was an anti-Islamic policy meant to
curtail northern dominance and slave raids in Southern
Sudan. Within this policy framework, vernacular lan-
guages in Southern Sudan became the language of
instruction  while  English  was  the  official  language.
Arabic  was  banned  from  school  and  government
offices  in  Southern  Sudan.  Although  these  policies
were 'based on indigenous cultural values and Christian
cultural  norms',  and  instilled  a  sense  of  identity  in
Southern Sudanese, the  real  aim was  to  link Sudan
with  East  Africa  for  easy  administration  as  part  of
British indirect rule system.
However,  these  policies  woefully  failed  to  spike
socio-economic development, but instead widened the
existing inequities between the North and South. In
the  1940s,  South  Sudan's  educational  infrastructure
was  comprised  of  a  limited  number  of  missionary
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schools,  few  elementary  government  schools,  one
teacher  training centre,  one commercial  school  and
one senior secondary school ([8] p. 2, [9] p. 3,[10] p.
86). Worse still, the British represented the indigenous
population  as  lazy  and  unenthusiastic  in  improving
their socio-economic wellbeing ([11] p. 32). However,
at the end of World War II the unity of Sudan took
greater impetus due to pressure from Egypt and the
northern  elites,  causing  the  British  to  address  the
need to accelerate economic and educational devel-
opment so as to put Northern and Southern Sudan at
par ([10] p. 88).
This  explains  why  in  1957,  the  Government  of
Sudan took over mission schools in South Sudan, and
in 1962 expelled Christian missionaries from the South
for  allegedly  inciting  South  Sudanese  against  the
Arabization  and  subsequent  Islamization  of  schools.
This suggests that one key factor for anti-government
agitation is the adoption of policies that exclude South
Sudanese from formal education opportunities, a sit-
uation  that  also  reflects  a  quality  of  education  far
removed  from  the  context  of  South  Sudan.  This
exclusion of South Sudanese from formal educational
opportunities further explains how lack of formal edu-
cation  affected  the  ability  of  South  Sudanese  to
participate in government beneficially, or to yield the
positive  externalities  of  an  educated  environment
which would generally have led to improved welfare of
the population in question [4].
The exclusion of  Southern Sudanese from formal
education severely curtailed their access to schools-
legitimized  their  cultural  suppression  and  social
exclusion. Furthermore, it lowered the retention rates
of  Southern  Sudanese at  school,  implying  their  ex-
clusion  from skilled  professions,  from public  service
institutions  and  political  participation  [4,12].  This
lends credence to the fact that in civil strife endemic
areas—(the  lack  of) education  generates  significant
negative  externalities.  Independence  was  eventually
brokered with  the  northern elites,  who became the
new colonial power. Thereafter, Sudan slipped into a
17 year civil war that ended in 1972.
In  the  post-independence  era—the  northern  Su-
danese elites and the Sudan central government effec-
tively  used the educational  apartheid  paradigm as a
political  tool,  underpinned  by  Arabo-Islamism as  the
cornerstone of national unity. The educational system
was  tacitly  used  to  undermine  the  religious  and
cultural diversity of Sudan since recognition of diver-
sity  was  perceived  as  incompatible  with  the  racio-
cultural  equity  of  the southern part to the northern
part of the country. Islamization was used as a tool of
civilization with the aim of erasing  "the pagan patri-
mony".  This  explains  why  Arabic  came  to  replace
English  as  the  language  of  instruction  leading  to
intense widening of the gap between north and south.
Additionally, apart from rewriting the history, Northern
Sudanese  historians  simultaneously  erased—"the
Sudanese  indigenous  history" while  the  culture  and
tradition of the latter  "have never been imparted in
education policy since the dawn of independence in
1956" ([8]  p.  2).  During  the  four  years  preceding
Sudan's independence, less than 8% of children in the
South  were  in  school,  while  the  share  of  girls  was
almost zero, compared to 20% of girls in the North
who were enrolled in all primary streams ([8] pp. 3‒
4).  After  self-autonomy in  1982,  the  Sudan  central
government failed to provide adequate resources and
social  and  economic  services  further  incapacitating
Southern Sudanese. With an estimated population of
20  million,  primary  school  enrolment  was  40%  in
Northern  Sudan,  while  it  was  less  than  12%  in
Southern  Sudan.  The  'Southern  policy'  of  forging  a
Sudanese identity for both the northen and southern
parts, which was based on the Arab-Islamic paradigm
with  the  educational  system  as  the  basis,  led  to
frustration and Southern Sudanese took up arms in
1982  agitating  for  independence  with  the  hope  of
establishing a more equitable and inclusive society.
At independence in 2011, the RSS was extremely
fragile due to decades of conflict with the Republic of
Sudan, partly over oil wealth. Prior to this date, since
independence in  1956 Sudan  has  been  engulfed  in
two major  civil  wars  (1955‒72,  and 1982‒present).
The country's new leadership is comprised largely of
former rebels who had often fought each other. Most
notably, Silva Kiir and his ex-deputy Riek Macher and
others  split  away  from  the  main  rebel  group—the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)
in 1991. The independence of the RSS has since been
only a lull as the rift between the protagonists Macher
and Kiir gets deeper and—intractable, inducing socio-
political  and  economic  exclusion  along  ethnic  lines,
commemorating—the political fractures that triggered
the RSS's fight for independence. The civil strife in the
RSS now exacerbates deep-seated ethnic animosities
and tensions. At independence the RSS was dismally
bereft of basic social services and infrastructure: the
outcome  of  decades  of  civil  strife  and  decades  of
neglect  despite  its  huge  oil  and  mineral  wealth.
Corruption and nepotism orchestrated on regional and
ethnic lines remained rampant and widespread [13].
Although  precluded  from  the  United  Nation's
Development  Programme's  (UNDP)  Human  Devel-
opment Index (HDI) due to data constraints, the 2006
Household Health Survey [14] and the 2009 National
Household Baseline Survey [15] provide some insights
into  human  development  trends  in  the  country.  In
2009, infant mortality rates were 102 out of 1'000 live
births,  a  slight  improvement  from 131  in  2008  and
lower than rates for Burundi (106). In the same period,
under-five mortality  rates dropped from 381 to  135
per  1'000 live births.  These improvements were the
result of a slight increment in public expenditure for
primary health care and the temporary return of peace
following the signing of the CPA. This notwithstanding,
South Sudan topped the global maternal mortality chart
in  2009 with  2'054 per 100'000 live births,  and the
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lowest  life  expectancy  in  East  Africa  at  42  years.
Education  and  formal  literacy  levels  remained
extremely low: only 27% of children over 15 years old
were considered literate (compared to 77% in Rwanda,
73% in Uganda, 70% in Tanzania, 62% in Kenya and
47% in Burundi). While the net school enrolment rate
was merely 48%, only 37% of  the total  population
above six years old had attended school. These trends
are attributable to long periods of  internecine strife
during  which  there  was  an  acute  shortfall  in  the
delivery of public goods and services as well as to the
accompanying insecurity. Low literacy is further com-
pounded by poor access rates, inadequate educational
infrastructure  and  the  potential  increase  in  demand
for  schooling  with  the  return  of  refugees.  The  net
intake rate to the first year of primary school stood at
14.6% [16].  The  pupil/teacher  ratio  was  52:1,  the
pupil classroom ratio was 129 children per classroom
and the net enrolment rate stood at 48% ([17] p. 17).
South Sudan ranks at the bottom of all human devel-
opment indicators: 8 out of 10 persons live on less
than $1.63 a day; a net primary education enrolment
of 46%; a qualified teacher to pupil ratio of 1:117 and
a literacy rate of 27% [18].  Estimates of the female
illiteracy rate exceed 80%, it has the the world's high-
est maternal mortality rate, less than 100 kilometres of
paved road, suffers from the risk of increased violence
and  harm  to  civilian  population  and  permanent
humanitarian suffering [18] given the ongoing political
turmoil in the country. About 38'000 children under 18
years  of  age have reportedly  been conscripted into
the army, forced labour or slavery over the past 15
years  in  Southern  Sudan.  These  abductions  have
eventuated into a demographic imbalance: a drastic
decrease in the number of males in the 20‒39 age
bracket when compared to females ([20] p. 1).  The
country  is  bedecked  by  lack  of  basic  services,  poor
harvests, rising food prices, lack of jobs, lack of gover-
nance skills  in  public  officials,  corruption/nepotism in
public  institutions  and  political  domination  [18].  The
country's economy is unhealthily dependent on oil that
guarantees 98% of GDP from which 35% of revenue is
spent on state security and security sector reforms and
7% and 4% respectively  are devoted to  health  and
education  [21].  Education  in  South  Sudan  is  facing
several challenges: poor coordination of education ser-
vices, lack of national goals, policies and standards for
education, increased insecurity, frequent displacement
and  the  constant  recruitment  of  male  children  by
warring factions as 'child soldiers'.
Compounding this situation and further threatening
the ephemeral peace with human security implications
is  climate  change  that  tends  to  exacerbate  the
degradation of the environment—and lead to resource
use conflicts and pose both direct and indirect threats
to  food security.  In  South  Sudan,  the  duration  and
timing of rain is becoming erratic. Rainy seasons are
increasingly not only delayed but also shortening at a
rate  of  30‒40% [22].  As  a result,  the  incidence of
drought and flooding are not only inevitable but are
increasingly becoming more frequent- temperatures are
rising in winter, often with disastrous consequences for
the population and the environment. These changing
rainfall  patterns spell  doom for rural  farmers in par-
ticular  and  the  population  at  large.  Further  conse-
quences of climate change include, but are not limited
to: cholera outbreaks, poor crop yields and late har-
vests,  as  well  as  severe  crop  losses.  The  drying  of
permanent  rivers  is  resulting  in  seasonal  rivers,  re-
duction  of  water  tables  in  boreholes,  delays  and
shortening  of  rainy  seasons.  Simultaneously,  some
regions  are  generally  receiving  less  rain,  and  the
amount of water is dropping, leading to drought. The
reduction in rainfall has turned millions of hectares of
already marginal semi-desert grazing land into desert.
People  have  been  forced  to  migrate  and  added
significant stress on the livelihoods of pastoral societies
as pastoralists and agriculturalists are at each other's
throats for access to scare natural resources. On the
other hand, some areas have more intense rain events,
driven by climate change, which contributes to more
run-off  and  floods,  threatening  food  security  and
settlements, and leading to diseases such as cholera.
The Sahara Desert is also expanding southwards [23].
The  change  in  rainfall  patterns  has  led  to  food  in-
security, vast migrations and loss of animals, especially
cattle. Crops and livestock are threatened in a country
where about 80% of the population are cattle rearers
leading  a  pastoralist  lifestyle.  There  is  also  intense
competition for natural resources which are increasingly
scarce due to global warming, leading to rapid defor-
estation, land grabbing, and tenure insecurity due to
resettlement of people returning to South Sudan after
the war, as well as high rates of land privatization. The
vicious  cycle  of  multiple  stresses  "endemic  poverty,
ecosystem degradation, complex disasters and conflicts,
and limited access to capital markets, infrastructure and
technology have all weakened people's ability to adapt
to changes in climate" ([23]  p. 3, [24] p. 2).
Deforestation  is  accelerating  due  to  wood  being
collected for fuel, charcoal production, livestock, agri-
culture, bricks, and the collection of construction mat-
erials. There is also intense competition for portable
water  between  people  and  livestock,  as  well  as
habitat degradation for livestock and wild life due to
vegetation degradation and desertification (most ac-
centuated in the North and Southeast).  It has been
estimated  that  in  the  Upper  Nile  province,  each
removed tree results in the deforestation of 0.03 ha
and  that  the  annual  use  of  charcoal  of  one  family
accounts  for  2.6  ha  of  deforestation  in  that  area.
Furthermore,  huge  quantities  of  charcoal  (60'000
bags) representing 2'700 hectares of deforested land
are also exported from the Renk County in Upper Nile
to Sudan ([22] p. 4, [37,38]). A study conducted by
the  International  Food  Policy  Research  Institute
(IFPRI) found that temperature anomalies significantly
affect the risk of conflict.  Through the prism of the
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local  weather  in  South  and  North  Sudan  between
1997 and  2009,  the  organization  maintains  that,  in
the future, the risk of violent conflict caused by global
warming is expected to magnify in a range of 21‒30%
under  a  median  scenario,  while  factoring  in  uncer-
tainties  in both the climate projection and the esti-
mate  of  the  response  of  violence  to  temperature
variations. The report further underlines that extreme
temperature shocks are found to strongly affect the
livelihood of violence as well, but the predictive power
is hindered by substantial uncertainty [22,23,25].
The latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classi-
fication (IPC) analysis conducted in April and May 2014
in South Sudan indicates that a conjuncture between
conflicts,  displacement,  destroyed  markets  and  dis-
rupted livelihoods has led to the deterioration of food
security since the outbreak of conflict in 2013.  Most
people  in  the  three  most  conflict-affected  states  of
Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei scored 4 on the IPC scale
of 5 showing an alarming increase in the number of
people in the IPC Food Security phase. Some 1.3 million
of  the  country's  11.5  million  people  are  experiencing
emergency  levels  of  food  insecurity. Additionally,  2.4
million people are in the IPC Food Crisis Phase (scoring
3 in the IPC scale of 5) suggesting that they need ur-
gent assistance [25]. These figures indicate that more
than one-third  of  South  Sudanese are  facing excep-
tional  levels  of  food insecurity.  These figures further
suggest  a  conjuncture  between  widespread  hunger,
and  growing  malnutrition,  diseases,  livelihood  losses
and the likelihood of death.
The  situation  is  likely  to  deteriorate  as  the  food
security crisis spreads to previously unaffected areas,
except farmers are able to plant their fields, fishing
communities  can  freely  have  access  to  rivers  and
water ways and herders can migrate between grazing
areas. Food secure communities are feeling the strain
of conflict as they experience the burden of hosting
internally displaced people. This has engendered con-
flict  over  scarce  resources,  leading  to  accentuated
environmental  degradation  [22,23,25].  The  lack  of
access  roads  makes  intervention  by  humanitarian
agencies challenging, as most displaced communities
are increasingly being cut off by a vicious cycle be-
tween  rains  that  bring  seasonal  flooding  and  inad-
equate access due to conflict. A cholera outbreak has
already claimed the lives of  23 people in  Juba and
forced more than 670 others to seek treatment [26].
The  surging  and  thriving  of  conflict  is  correlated
with  low  HDI  and  human  insecurity.  In  the  RSS,
human  development  and  conflict  are  intertwined:
"War and violence pervade all aspects of human de-
velopment". The impacts may be direct, when people
are killed or injured.  "Or they may be more indirect
conditions of insecurity blocking farmers from working
their lands, women from leaving their homes for fear
of sexual violence or children from attending schools.
The  absence  of  peace  constrains  the  choices  and
freedoms of people. Peace provides the foundation for
life, human development and human freedom". Hu-
man security argues for placing the human individual
at  the  centre  of  security  attention,  rather  than  fo-
cusing on the rise or fall of state power alone. The
risks  stemming from multiple  threats  to  the human
individual and communities in (South) Sudan emerge
as  a  key  means  to  understand and  assess  security
challenges, from violent conflict to lack of adequate
drinking  water  or  access  to  medicines  to  manage
diseases.  "Human  security  effectively  serves  as  a
mirror  of  human development:  while  human devel-
opment as an approach focuses on expanding the real
freedoms people enjoy,  human security  ensures the
protection of these freedoms" ([27] pp. 18‒19).
The human security framework is underpinned by
the premise that high human development can help
generate conditions for peacebuilding by removing ec-
onomic and social injustice as a cause for grievance.
And that peace in turn can help to establish human
security  conditions  that  further  human development
achievements.  This reinforcing relationship can break
the vicious cycle of low human development and con-
flict experienced in Sudan ([27] p. 19). Low levels of
human development  and  high levels  of  poverty  and
inequality act as drivers of conflict. The lack of schools,
or poor education quality with thwarted aspirations and
high levels of unemployment can create a volatile pool
of disaffected young people. The population of South
Sudan is estimated at 8.3 million: 4 million (48.2%)
are  female  and  4.3  million  (51.8%)  are  male.  It
should  be  noted  that  a  large  proportion  of  the
population of South Sudan are still refugees living in
other countries. The population was estimated to have
expanded  to  10.6  million  by  July  2012  due  to  the
return of refugees [17]. There is a high concentration
of the population in rural areas. The annual population
growth  rate  stands  at  2.9% with  a  low  population
density of 13 people per square kilometre. About 72%
of the population is aged below 30 years, 51% under
18 and 30% under 10. Most South Sudanese people
are young, live in rural areas. The CPA (2005) led to
the temporal restoration of peace, saw improved devel-
opment indicators, the return of refugees and improve-
ment in fertility and life expectancy. This has resulted in
increased demand for extra resources to deliver public
goods, especially in rural areas ([17] p. 8) where pov-
erty is a lived reality.
More than half  of the population (50.6%) is  con-
sidered poor. However, poverty is gendered with wo-
men accounting for 51.6% of those living below the
national poverty line of US$ 28 per month. Poverty is
accentuated in rural  areas, home to nine out of ten
poor people.  This is  significant,  given that 24.4% of
urban against  55.4% of  rural  people  are considered
poor.  The  incidence  of  poverty  varies  across  states:
three quarters of poor people are found in Northern
Bahr El  Ghazal  whereas,  only a quarter  of  the pop-
ulation in Upper Nile are considered poor ([17] p. 9).
The geography of poverty in  South Sudan is  further
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characterized by high inequalities in incomes. A huge
gap exists in consumption between the poor and non-
poor. The Gini-coefficient (a benchmark used to esti-
mate inequality) puts the gap between the poor and
non-poor at 45.5. Collaborating this estimate, the 2009
National Household Baseline Survey showed that con-
sumption per person in the uppermost 90th deciles of
the population was more than ten times that in the
lowermost 10 deciles and that on average, poor people
consumed about 25% more than the non-poor [14].
The  existence  of  significant  development  disparities
between urban and rural  areas is driving rural-urban
migration and growth in the informal sector, thereby
depriving rural areas of productive human capital and
exacerbating poverty.
Nevertheless, poverty and low human development
achievements  are  only  partial  causes  for  insecurity.
Colonial  roots  and  environmental  degradation  also
play important roles. "Sudan might be the first site of
violence induced by climate change. The movement of
the Sahara desert up to 150 kilometres in some loca-
tions poses a severe threat to migratory groups or set-
tled population over dwindling resources. This makes
environmental stewardship a central concern for peace
and human development in Sudan" ([28] p. 20).
4. Education and the Liberal Peace Project
Critical scholars on peacebuilding are unanimous on the
need for social justice and welfare inclusion to the LPP
as a desirable emancipatory approach to achieve sus-
tainable civil  peace in post war environments [7,29‒
32]. This is because post Cold War civil conflicts are
multidimensional. They involve tensions around ethnic
identity;  the  failure  of  legitimate  or  effective  gover-
nance, discriminatory politics, widespread poverty and
socio-economic inequality between constituent groups,
war economies thriving on the capture and trade of
natural resources, and easy access to small arms and
light weapons [33‒34]. As a consequence, international
efforts at peace operations have evolved through four
generations: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, International
Statebuilding into  peacebuilding or  the  Liberal  Peace
Project—LPP [2].  Boutros  Boutros-Ghali  first  injected
the concept of Peacebuilding into the UN system in his
An Agenda for Peace, raising the need for multilateral
international  interventions  in  conflict  zones  to  effect
policy  reforms beyond monitoring disarmaments  and
supervising the implementation of  peace agreements
among warring parties to effecting post conflict peace-
building [1].
From the 1990s,  multilateral  peacebuilding actors
assumed that "there is a universally agreed normative
and cultural  basis for the liberal  peace (model) and
that interventionary practices derived from this will be
properly supported by all actors"  ([35] p. 111).  Sub-
sequently, the international policy of post war recon-
struction  emphasized  peace  agreements,  security
sector  reform,  democratic  institutions  (constitution
building, elections, rule of law institutions, human rights
enforcement) and the installation of a free market eco-
nomic model in post-settlement Peacebuilding [29,36].
Unfortunately, about half of the peacebuilding missions
failed in about five years of liberal  peace import,  as
evidenced by  recurring  violence,  and thereby raising
policy failure alarms [37], raising a need for the LPP to
move from institutional peace (non-violent status quo
based  on  anchoring  post  conflict  states  within  the
normative and legal  contexts  of  transnational  organ-
izations  such  as  the  UN)  and  constitutional  peace
(resting upon the establishment of democratic values
and free trade in post conflict states) to civil peace—
founded on averting violence through immediate post
conflict state response to citizen advocacy and mobi-
lization for welfare needs and social justice [7]. 
Both its critics and its advocates argue that the LPP
paradigm  is  in  crisis  because  it  prioritizes  building
government capacity (which tends to guarantee insti-
tutional and constitutional peace) that will deliver in-
clusive, social welfare services only in the future over
more immediate capacity building and instant service
delivery,  which  brings  about  civil  peace  [29,7,31].
Critics argue that liberal peace missions have largely
recreated  states  (Afghanistan,  Somalia,  Liberia,  An-
gola, Haiti and even Cambodia) with weak domestic
governance incapable of providing public goods, poor
human rights records and contexts where the rule of
law is increasingly questionable and where conditions
for a relapse to armed violence are imminent [37,38].
Furthermore, lack of local ownership [36], close ended
time frames of liberal peace mission that conceive of
peace  as  a  state  of  affairs  rather  than  a  dynamic
process  and  lack  of  strategic  coordination  and
inadequate  attention  to  domestic  tensions  and  local
context [29,38] have been invoked as the causes of the
failure of liberal peace. As a concept, the LPP connotes
provision  of  post  conflict  humanitarian  assistance;
political,  social  and economic reconstruction; security
sector reform and international statebuilding. The LPP
is underpinned by conservative, orthodox and eman-
cipatory  theories  [7]  but  the  practical  methods  for
achieving sustainable peace or civil peace in post con-
flict countries like South Sudan are elusive [32,7].
Robin  Luckham,  a  key  advocate  of  the  eman-
cipatory  approach  to  peacebuilding  emphasises  the
relationship between democracy, security and devel-
opment as being the cornerstone of global liberal go-
vernance.  This  relationship,  he  concedes,  should
inform the conceptualization of the fourth generation
peace interventions [39]. Peacebuilding is thus—recon-
structed through local and international agencies, and
their mediation,  to include institutions, rights,  needs,
culture, and custom, from security, political, economic,
social welfare and justice perspectives dictated by the
internal context of the mission [40]. Commenting on
the fragility of the LPP in South Sudan, Ylonen suggests
that there is need for the peacebuilding interventions
and the South Sudan government to create political,
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economic and social  institutions that are inclusive as
well as providing wider access to welfare services [32].
However,  the  practical  ways  to  deliver  civil  peace
through  this  emancipatory  approach  that  guarantee
structures preventing a relapse into conflict have re-
mained elusive. 
Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
to the independence (2011) and post independence of
South Sudan, peacebuilding has suffered from a lack
of local reception, a lack of durable participatory gov-
ernance and a frequent  relapse  into  violent  conflict
[32]. It has been argued that liberal peacebuilding in
South  Sudan  is  detached  from  the  internal  reality
thereby making stability in the country fragile. Among
other things, "tangible development progress, such as
(the) building of hospitals or gaining access to quality
education, are seen as vital in establishing peace and
this  realization  needs  to  be  at  the  heart  of  peace-
building activities" ([30] p. 10). Formal education—the
medium for  imparting pedagogic  instruction,  shared
values, good attitudes and behaviours [41] is a social
welfare  institution,  a  social  justice  mechanism  for
marginalized  and  disgruntled  groups  and  a  locally
acclaimed means  for  the  emancipatory  approach to
the  LPP  to  take  root  in  South  Sudan.  In  countries
emerging from wars, a well designed formal education
curriculum may ease psychological violence (fear and
hatred) in the minds of survivors and victors, helping
them to desist from being fanatics, or supporting ide-
ology that legitimize structural violence [42]. It must be
stated that formal  education,  in  post war settlement
countries may make or mar new publics either creating
"a conglomerate of self indulgent consumers; … (and)
angry  soulless,  directionless,  hopeless  masses;  indif-
ferent,confused citizens; or a public imbued with con-
fidence, sense of purpose…respect for tolerance" ([43]
p. 18). This implies that the formal education curricula
in peace reconstruction countries like the RSS should
foster  positive social  relations,  multiethnic integration
and community development.
A 1994 review of 98 country cases from 1960‒1990
by George Psacharopoulos shows that the private and
social rates of returns from primary education stand at
20.8%  and  18.2%  in  annual  returns  of  the  initial
costs, reducing poverty and enhancing social welfare
for countries that opt for policies that broaden access
to primary  education  [44,5].  Moreover,  post-primary
vocational training would yield social benefits (positive
externalities  such  as  modernization  and  social  inte-
gration of ethnic groups, improved civic engagement
and  improved  standards  of  living).  In  addition  to
private  gains  (e.g.  jobs,  greater  income,  savings,
investments),  formal  vocational  training  will  help
broaden the government revenue source and sustain
peace dividends and the production of public goods
for example, security and basic services [6]. We argue
that  the  private  returns  of  education  can  be  easily
measured  in  quantitative  terms  (e.g.  in  income  or
contribution  of  taxes  coming  from  such  income  to
government revenue or jobs that are created because
of training and its impact on Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). The Social returns of education are qualitative
in nature and it  is  common knowledge that for  the
more literate populations of the North, it might be less
easy to persuade citizens into patronage politics. Such
citizens tend more than their uneducated counterparts
to issues of the day and engage into political and civil
life in more beneficial ways.
However, in its 2011‒2013 Development Plan, the
Government  of  South  Sudan  recognised  that  its
education and health indicators are among the lowest
in  the  world,  reflecting  the  impact  of  protracted
conflict and limited provision of social services. Only
27% of the adult population is literate and less than
half  of  all  primary-school-age-children are  in  school
(51% of boys and 37% of girls). The ratio of qualified
teachers to pupils stands at 1:117 [21]. Yet education
is  positioned with  regard to  the  budget  as  the last
priority area in its development plan. Apart from the
fact  that  external  actors  (foreign  states  and
intergovernmental  organizations)  commit  inadequate
funding  and  capacity  building  to  revive  access  to
quality education in South Sudan—6% of 2009 donor
funding [45,18], the new deal for measuring progress
in peacebuilding excludes education and only focuses
on legitimate politics, security, legal justice, economic
foundation and state revenues [45].
In fact, most international agencies  "opted not to
support  and  facilitate  the  creation  of  a  conducive
education  policy  environment but  rather  to  work  in
isolation  under  the  pretext  of  supporting  the  com-
munity-based  education  initiatives".  Also,  the  donor
communities have different perspectives to education
in conflict areas. While the United States Agency for
International  Development  (USAID)  supports  edu-
cation  in  South  Sudan,  other  donors  have  taken  a
rather  lukewarm attitude  towards  education  ([8]  p.
11). This is the case even when education has been
recognised during civil war as a right for all children
as well as a need that must be met. Such arguments,
following Sommers have 'tugged more at the heart-
strings than the purse strings of major international
donors'  ([46]  p.  24).  While  USAID  supports  basic
education, other international donors have been pre-
occupied with the misplaced view that education is a
luxury in emergencies and not a humanitarian need
([47] p. 9). As a collective responsibility, the provision
of  education  to  all  children  despite  prevailing  con-
ditions calls for coordinated efforts and actions even
in  situations  where  international  NGOs  do  not  nor-
mally work [46]. One of the ingredients that ignited
war in Sudan was the marginalisation and exclusion of
South Sudanese through the education system, which
eventually  led  to  deep  differences  in  political  and
economic relations between North and South Sudan.
Education promotes global human values and citizen-
ship both in peace time and during civil wars.
The dark cloud of interethnic conflicts in the history
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of South Sudan suggests that peace accords that do
not target the structural causes of conflict—exclusion
from social welfare services, domination or suppression
of ethnic identities, centre-periphery inequality, conflict
over resources, intra-elite competition and brute causes
or  criminality  risk-  relapsing into  a  cycle  of  violence
[48].  If  accountable  institutions  are  not  in  place  to
guarantee  immediate  socio-political  inclusion,  social
welfare and economic equity for the majority of her cit-
izens, a country risks not attaining durable or civil peace
but an unstable institutional and constitutional peace.
5. International Intervention and the Quest for 
Durable Peace
The  historical  causes  of  conflict  in  South  Sudan
(categorized as 'new war') may seem intractable [34]
but  the  internal  causes  of  regular  post-settlement
violence suggest that statebuilding priorities retain ma-
jor  elements  of  the structure of  political  power that
undergird  the  historical  past  of  the  RSS  [49].  In
prioritizing this statebuilding, the LPPs in the RSS are
undermining durable peace in the country.Schomerous
and  Allen's  incisive  review  of  the  LPP  in  the  RSS
reached the same conclusion ([30] p. 10). International
peacebuilders use the orthodoxy approach of the LPP:
prioritizing  internationalization  of  the  RSS  by  habit-
uating  new political  norms  that  tend to  reflect  con-
ditions  and  benchmarks  of  global  governance  insti-
tutions,  promoting  values  like  accountability,  trans-
parency, separation of powers and elections. To sustain
liberal peace in the RSS, however, the National Demo-
cratic  Institute  (NDI)  recommend  that  these  inter-
ventions would have to consider concomitantly more
emphasis  on  "better  access to  services that  leads to
improvements on the quality of life and guarantee peace
dividends" to  marginalized  and  politically  excluded
groups ([50] p. 71). 
Table 1. Key areas of conflict addressed by international interventions.
Reform of justice and 
security institutions
Culture of justice, truth 
and reconciliation
Good governance Socioeconomic 
development
Reintegration of 
demobilised soldiers is 
insufficient
Uncertainty about the 
future and false 
expectations
North/South disparities, 
and intra-South 
marginalisation
Status of the Three 
Areas. International 
attention diverted from 
the Three Areas.
Undeveloped police and 
justice systems
Hardening of ethnic 
identities
Tensions around 
centralisation and weak 
structures at State levels
Migration of armed 
pastoralists (this has not 
featured in 2005); 
discontented and under-
employed youth
Incomplete disarmament 
among the population 
Unresolved issues of 
access to natural 
resources
Lack of representation Returnees want access to
resources. Return 
destabilies communities
Source: ([51] p. 43).
Table 1 shows the orthodox approaches of multilateral
interventions like the UN and bilateral (largely, the US)
promotion of liberal peace. The bolded areas of inter-
vention  in  post  conflict  Sudan  are  indicated  on  the
figure including the following: reintegration of soldiers,
development of police and justice systems, addressing
tensions  around  centralization/weak  state  structures
and the reintegration of  returning refugees do dom-
inate the LPP in the RSS. However, these peacebuilding
endeavour must be pursued at the same time with felt
needs of the local communities if peace is to be sus-
tained. By comparing what international peacebuilders
pursue, what the Government of the RSS pursues and
the  funding  priorities  of  the  main  actors  of  peace-
building, we discover a gap between the international
objectives of legitimating the new state and the actual
local  needs  for  sustainable  peace.  As  Roland  Paris
rightly  warns,  while  "immediate  democratization  and
marketization" (stable  market  democracies)  of  war-
shattered states is good wisdom, hastily resorting to
this process is likely to be counterproductive:  "market
democracy is not the miracle cure for internal conflict".
Political and economic liberalization is an inherently un-
settling process.  It can instead aggravate social  ten-
sions and undermine the prospects for stable peace in
the fragile post-war conditions typical of countries just
emerging  from civil  war.  Good wisdom dictates  that
post-conflict  peacebuilding  begins  with  the  estab-
lishment of a network of domestic institutions that are
capable  of  dealing  with  the  unfettered  effects  of
democratization and marketization, as well as the grad-
ual phasing in of political and economic reforms at the
appropriate time. For this to be effective, peacebuilders
must  refrain  from the  unrealistic  view that  war-torn
states can be rehabilitated over night ([29] p. 14).
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Figure 1. Funding priorities of the RSS (GoSS) versus funding priorities of international peacebuilders.
Source: ([51] p. 3).                                                                                                                        
Figure 1 shows how peacebuilding funding to some
basic  services  such  as  water  and  education  easily
elude international intervention in post conflict Sudan,
despite the felt local need of access to these services.
When this figure is cast against the wider Government
of South Sudan (2010) budget, security accounts for
35% of the country's expenditure, basic services like
health and education account for 7% and 4% respec-
tively and rural development accounts for 3.4% of the
budget [18]. From the perspective of the emancipatory
approach  to  liberal  peace,  the  RSS  was  increasingly
being set for relapse into violence because of the lack
of peace dividends and adequate social welfare among
marginalized  and  rural  communities  emerging  from
conflict. Returnees expected better levels of services,
non  discrimination  along  tribal  lines  (or  Dinka
domination)  and  deconcentration  of  development  in
Juba.  Without  these,  and  as  predicted  by  Afro-
barometer [51], the local masses have been constantly
anticipating  violence.  Politicians  have  continued  to
develop power bases centered on ethnic identity which
eventuated into the crumbling of the current existing
negative peace as of 15 December 2013.
International  intervention  into  peacebuilding  in
Sudan has largely been a top-down process aimed at
replicating westernity without regard to local context.
The  current  LPP  approaches  highly  prioritize  cen-
tralized urban political institutions over heterogeneous
local needs and preferences, which retard the bringing
about of peace that the citizenry wish for themselves
leading  to  authoritarian  peace  that  narrows  down
political participation of citizens in elections. To guar-
antee durable civil peace in the RSS, Oliver Richmond
suggest that orthodox peacebuilding must depart from
the LPP and focus  on  "how one can move  beyond
hegemonic, authoritarian peace towards an everyday
notion of peace sensitized to the local as well as the
state  and  the  global… and resting  on  a  just  social
order and solidarity" ([40] p. 109).
6. The Local Context of Social Welfare Exclusion
and the LPP in South Sudan
Afrobarometer's  survey on what  legitimizes  a  demo-
cratic society showed that 89% of respondents pointed
to basic needs provision (water, food and shelter) while
75% want "democracy to deliver … education, ... more
strongly  ...  they  insist  on  regular  elections,  majority
rule, competing political parties or freedom to criticize
the  government" ([52]  p.  2).  Similarly,  a  survey  of
Southern Sudan by the NDI reported that the move for
secession from Sudan is "to avert domination of Arabs
… and … that  independent  Southern  Sudan  will  be
more  prosperous" ([53]  p.  7).  This  implies  that  the
fragility of the democratic institutions in the RSS that
translates into frail  liberal  peace is wanting from the
perspective  of  delivering immediate  improvements  in
the socio-economic sphere.
Afrobarometer's  survey  of  nineteen  African  states
undergoing peacebuilding in 2008, found out that 66%
of  the  populace  saw  their  government's  economic
policies as not benefiting,  but instead worsening the
standards of living of the poor. Also, 50% of survey
respondents opined that their local government insti-
tutions  were  illegitimate,  using  revenues  for  private
gain  rather  than providing  public  services  [54].  This
suggests that in a country recovering from conflict like
the RSS, the attainment of durable peace can tend to
be fragile.
In a bid to graduate from an orthodox to an eman-
cipatory approach that leads to durable peace in the
LPP, it has been suggested that governments that have
weak institutions must concentrate on providing public
services such as security in poor neighbourhoods and
in  local  markets.  Also,  the  government  in  such  a
situation should concomitantly assess what needs con-
stitute, as well as what local populations' perception of
peace dividends is [55]. This implies that international
intervention  in  South  Sudan's  LPP  would  best  yield
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durable peace if it supports the country to efficiently
respond to services needed by the most vulnerable of
the local masses in the short and long term.
A foreign peacebuilding actor in the RSS conducted
a survey using 67 focused group discussion sessions
and  a  sample  of  700  persons  representative  of  all
states,  locations,  tribes,  religions,  genders  and  age
groups from March to June 2011 on two issues: Firstly,
on the preference of the local masses as to the anchor
of  peacebuilding among Democracy,  Development or
both.  Secondly,  on  what  democratization  agenda
should be pursued in peacebuilding. Participants over-
whelmingly  (59.1%) preferred  that  in  peacebuilding,
development (well being, improved standards of living)
should precede democracy (elections); 37.7% preferred
democracy  to  development  whereas  3.2% preferred
that  both  democracy  and  development  be  pursued
simultaneously in the LPP. While those who preferred
development thought of democracy as politics and an
urban affair, those who believed in democracy defined
it in terms of the socio-economic dividends it may offer
in post-conflict times [56]. This resonates with the view
that the narrow definition and support for liberal peace
by the international community in line "with the over-
arching  neoliberal  economic  paradigm and  failure  to
embrace  an  inclusivist  approach  to  peacebuilding"
works  against  "effective  reconstruction,  growth  and
development" ([57]  p.  192).  A  primary-school-edu-
cated, Christian male in Juba for example, said  "with
democracy, government will hear the cry of the people
and then bring development." Democracy was further
thought of as a way to handle tribalism, nepotism and
corruption  that  make  public  service  institutions
inefficient and ineffective ([58] p. 15). The Second sur-
vey question on which priorities public services must
focus  on  in  peacebuilding  showed  that:  as  a  first,
second  and  third  preference  for  peace  dividend,
education constitutes 24.9%, 32.8% and 21.8% of the
whole  sample  surveyed.  In  general,  access  to  edu-
cation is the second significant measure of expected
peace dividend in the RSS. It is only second to access
to water as  the first,  chosen by 27.5%, 14.6% and
19.5% of the survey respondents as their first, second
and third preference in public service provision if the
LPP in is to yield durable peace. In general, healthcare
provisioning  features  as  the  third  public  service
provision  that  should  underpin  durable  peace  in  the
country.
Figure 2. Local preferences for peace dividends in the RSS.
Source: ([57] p. 17).                                                        
The data presented in figure 2 above corroborate a
joint  survey  of  the  RSS  by  the  London  School  of
Economics (LSE) and the Partners Achieving Change
together  (PACT)—a  development  organization.  The
LSE/PACT study concluded that better access to social
services  guaranteed  through  infrastructural  devel-
opment  and  improved  quality  of  life  would  be  the
most  remarkable  aspects  of  any  durable  peace  in
South Sudan [30]. But how should social welfare be
initiated and sustained for South Sudan's most ven-
erable  groups?  A  religious  leader  in  Raja  County,
South Sudan puts it thus: "information and knowledge
is  desperately  needed  for  us  to  become  informed
citizens" ([30]  p.  71).  This  is  because  as  argued
below, education does not only improve the quality of
civic engagement but also the quality of life for the
educated and of the community in which he or she
lives as a whole.
7. Formal Education and Liberal Peace in South 
Sudan
Formal  schooling  and  training  in  conflict  trans-
formation sensitizes a society to the inequities of the
system to facilitate intergroup dialogue, healing and
reconciliation, and nurturing the idea or capacity for
peace  through  integrated  schools  having  curricula
related to community relations, vocational training and
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community development at primary and post primary
vocational levels [41]. The need for education to help
citizens  to  contribute  to  quality  participatory  gover-
nance has been avidly expressed in South Sudan [30].
It  has  been  made  clear  that  restricted  access  to
education or an inappropriate curriculum such as the
Arabization  or  Islamization  of  Southern  Sudanese
schools [4,8–9,11], has led to the deterioration of inter-
ethnic relations [42], created an unskilled, corrupt, and
Dinka dominated civil service [18], making liberal peace
unstable in the country. Although the United Nation's
International  Children's  Emergency  Fund's  (UNICEF)
current  Peace  Education  initiative  in  South  Sudan
organizes workshops in mediation, negotiation, conflict
management and non-competitive dialogue, it is a top-
down process that helps in resolving immediate and
proximate  causes  of  violence  and  not  the  structural
causes in rather abstract ways [42].
Peacebuilding education should rather be a bottom-
up process in which pupils of primary school age are
incentivized (through provision of meals at school, for
instance) to keep them at school, where they will be
reoriented to attitudes of peace. In a limited top-down
process,  international  peacebuilders  should  support
the  RSS  to  build  primary  schools  and  post-primary
schools, teacher training colleges and vocational insti-
tutions so as to support durable peace. It is a process
founded  on  the  experiences  and  opportunities  to
augment the capacity  for wellbeing among a highly
unskilled and unemployed South Sudanese youth by
providing  them  with  immediate  and  relevant  voca-
tional training that facilitates entrepreneurship, trade
and  higher  incomes  that  incentivize  them  to  avert
proclivity  to  war.  As  an indispensable factor,  peace-
building  education  should  be  immediately  incor-
porated  into  current  orthodox  democratization  and
free market institutionalization of the current LPP in
Sudan  in  order  to  actualize  the  emancipatory  ap-
proach to the LPP that results in durable civil peace.
8. Access to Primary Education and the 
Durability of Liberal Peace
After the CPA the number of pupils enrolled in primary
school  increased from about 700'000 to 1.6 million.
However, the the RSS does not yet have the capacity
to  keep  up  with  the  demand  for  education.  Ad-
ditionally, donor support for education remains highly
insufficient through reconstruction programmes in the
country [58]. UNICEF estimates that in Sudan 70% of
children aged between 6 and 17 have never been to
school,  1  out  of  10  pupils  complete  primary  school
and less than 2% of the population have completed
primary  schooling  [58].  Worse  still,  a  2009  assess-
ment  revealed  that  96%  of  all  teachers  in  South
Sudan  have  no  formal  training  [59].  The  lack  of
access to education is captured in figure 3 below in
which school pupils in Yei, Jonlei state are seen sitting
on makeshift benches under a tree.
Figure 3. Pupils studying under a tree.
The picture above tells the tragic story of the acute
lack of space for teachers and classrooms for learning.
Wandera, an adult learner in Kuol, South Sudan who
thinks that education will preclude war in the country
asserts  that:  "Education  is  very,  very  important  for
peace. If you are educated you will be able to know
what  peace  is,  you  will  be  able  to  educate  people
about reconciliation, forgiveness and coming together
to  solve  problems".  While  equating  education  to
peace,  respondents  were  unanimous  that  "an  edu-
cated individual will be able to think and act well, put
his or her education to good use for development and
will have an open-mind" (Jacob, Interview, Dengnhial,
11 May 2013). According to the North-South Institute,
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a  combination  of  peace,  civic  and  citizenship  edu-
cation will instill a sense of responsible citizenship that
"fosters a culture of peace and peacebuilding through
conflict mitigation, resolution and reconciliation. Civic
education  seeks  to  build  an  understanding  of  the
democratic  system  based  on  notions  of  civic  and
human rights. Citizenship education attempts to teach
an awareness of rights and responsibilities and instill
respect for others' rights and viewpoints" ([60] p. 1).
Figure 4 below shows Dengnhial primary school pupils
appealing  to  the  SPLM/A  to  turn  war  policies  into
development projects.
Figure 4. Calls for the transformation of war policies into development policies.
Reychler Luc holds that formal education facilitates
sustainable peace in three ways that are relevant to
the  South  Sudanese  context,  if  the  curricula  are
designed  to  foster  community  relations  and  com-
munity  development [42].  Firstly,  primary  education
would  be  a  forum for  effective  interethnic  commu-
nication. Considering that about 66 ethnic languages
are spoken in South Sudan [26] , the use of English
as a common language will serve as a good medium
for fostering and nurturing interethnic communication.
Secondly, it helps dismantle sentimental walls related
to perceived domination by the Dinka or other forms
of groupings such as the SPLM. Increased access to
primary schooling takes away despair from victims of
social  exclusion because  it  nurtures individuals  with
requisite skills for future political participation and in
the long run, solves political tensions. Hannah Bol, in
Kuol,  asserted  that  "Now  that  schools  have  been
opened,  everyone  has  seen  that  education  is  im-
portant and that they need to come, and that war and
guns are not the future!" [26]. Thirdly, formal primary
schooling  in  integrated  schools  promotes  an  inte-
grative political climate [42]. The government of the
RSS currently runs on the basis of exclusive circles of
patronage  and  marginalization  [46].  Participation  in
governance would therefore, become skill-based with
the introduction of formal education.
9. Vocational Education, Peace Dividends and 
the Durability of Liberal Peace 
This  study  has  established  that  there  is  a  strong
correlation,  almost a favourable causal  link between
the  provision  of  peace  dividends  (schooling,  health
services,  jobs,  higher  living  standards,  social  devel-
opment)  and  the  durability  of  peace.  "The  lack  of
livelihoods opportunities  for  youth and the potential
for creating and exacerbating tensions and relapse to
violence" in post war states has also been noted ([49]
p. XVII). This has been recorded especially in Lakes,
Warrap, Jonglei and Upper Nile States, which are the
most conflict-affected regions in South Sudan. In the
survey conducted by the NDI on what locals in South
Sudan preferred as peace dividends, some said "If we
are  educated…we  would  not  so  much  think  of
government  to  do  for  us  everything;" "we  would
create our own project and work on our own roads
but  we  do  not  have  the  skills  so  we  really  need
education to be the priority  here" ([60] p.  9).  One
respondent told us that  "Giving us education is like
teaching us how to fish, and help ourselves instead of
perpetually  depending  on  others" (Joseph,  Jonglei,
interview of 20 May 2013).
This suggests that for international peace building
interventions to solidify peace, the RSS must be sup-
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ported to create an enabling environment for young
people's  livelihoods  and/or  employment  [62].
Considering the very low literacy levels in South Sudan,
the  setting  up  of  rural  craft  schools  in  carpentry,
masonry,  pottery,  and  agriculture  and  institutes  for
electricity  and  electronics,  maintenance,  production
engineering, dress making, nursing, clerical studies are
necessary if durable peace is to be attained. For our
intent,  vocational  studies help  academically  less  able
students, instilling technological knowledge related to
some  particular  function,  craft  and  trade  [62].  The
following figure is a framework showing how vocational
education can bring about peace dividends to sustain
peace.
Figure 5. The links between vocational training and peace dividends.
In the past, vocational training has been criticized
as a financially costly policy to implement, being of
lower value to academic or general education in terms
of the low income it attracts and the false probability
that  it  can  guarantee  quicker  employment  [62].
Nowadays,  vocational  education  is  seen  as  training
that  facilitates  the  acquisition  of  specific  vocational
skills  for  a  lifetime  that  would  manifest  in  entre-
preneurship, poverty reduction and the integration of
idling young people [in South Sudan] into the working
world of the informal or private sector [63,64].
In  practice,  vocational  education  would  train  the
workforce  for  self-employment  and  raise  the  pro-
ductivity of the informal sector [63]. The availability of
skills  would attract more foreign direct investments,
modernizing  South  Sudan  and  promoting  hetero-
geneous communities  that  facilitate interethnic inte-
gration.Vocational training is analogous to some form
of social engineering: transforming unemployed youth
to  find  employment,  providing  poor  segments  in
society  with  a  rising  income  and  improved  living
standards  and  supplying  to  a  community  emerging
from the destruction of war, middle level technicians
such as, nurses, midwives, plumbers and brick layers
[61].  This  is  why vocational  education is  considered
socially useful work, which would help citizens develop
stronger awareness of the contribution of their work to
the  wellbeing  of  society  [62].  When  social  welfare
development for all is triggered through the extension
of access to formal schooling, the democratization and
institutionalization of the free market that yield fragile
authoritarian  peace,  constitutional  peace  and  insti-
tutional peace graduate into an emancipatory approach
that  addresses  social  injustices  to  yield durable civic
peace. 
10. Conclusion
This study has found that the deeply rooted causes of
relapse  to  violence  in  South  Sudan  are  historically
situated  on  ethnic  segregation  orchestrated  by  the
Anglo-Egyptian rule of the then Southern Sudan. This
dual rule left the area bereft of public goods, social
welfare  institutions  or  solid  economic  development
outcomes.  This  segregation  extended  to  political
exclusion  as  at  independence,  of  more  than  900
positions of  postcolonial  administration,  people from
the three states of southern Sudan only got appointed
into 8 [21].
Shortly,  after  independence,  restricted  access  to
social  welfare,  especially  formal  education  informed
ethnic domination over or the exclusion of Southern
Sudanese in the realm of political participation. Con-
sequently,  the  incomprehensible  nature  of  the  CPA
that legitimized the Dinka's domination of the SPLM/A
government caused the exclusion of significant local
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actors from the peace deal. Subsequent political par-
ticipation  has  further  undermined  the  search  for
durable  peace.  Because  most  of  the  liberal  peace
building in independent South Sudan fails  to  imple-
ment projects that simultaneously strengthen demo-
cratic  institutions  as  well  as  addressing  the  deep
rooted causes of relapse to conflict, for example the
lack of social welfare institutions that should lead to
peace  dividends,  the  liberal  peace  that  is  this  far
instituted or constituted is indeed, fragile.
Surveys conducted by Afrobarometer [52] and the
NDI [60] indicating local preference for the immediate
delivery of formal education, health and other basic
needs  (clean  water)  over  democratization,  suggest
that  the  Liberal  Peace  Export  to  South  Sudan  is
divorced from local context, making the transposition
of liberal peace projects ineffective and making liberal
peace  fragile  in  the  country.  This  asymmetry  of
information  on  what  constitutes  need  for  durable
peace between international peacebuilders (principal)
and the South Sudanese citizens and locals (agent)
has exacerbated ethnic marginalization and made the
institutional  installations  of  the  LPP  faulty.  This
dovetails with the failure of neoliberal peace project in
post-conflict Sierra Leone [56]. 
The issue of  marginalization translates to lack of
services  (like  water,  health  and  education)  against
areas/peoples  in  the  Jonglei  and  Blue  Nile  states.
These  areas  are  also  lagging  behind  in  terms  of
representation in political structures. The role of the
State in regulating such disparities has been minimal
or even negative. It operates on the basis of exclusive
circles  of  patronage  and  marginalization.  Margin-
alization plays out as the stick and patronage as the
carrot within the context of  social  welfare exclusion
and  inclusion  among  different  ethnic  groups  [45].
Although  the  emancipatory  approach  is  considered
impractical in the LPP, this research recommends the
provision  of  primary  education  and  post-primary
vocational education as a policy implementation path
to actualize the emancipatory approach to the LPP in
South Sudan.
A  low  level  of  female  education  in  the  RSS
translates  into  the  inability  to  control  birth  rates,
implying  continuous  growth  in  population  and  in-
sufficient consumption. Many households in the RSS
are already  "living on a sub-sustainable level, due in
part to an uneven distribution of resources, but also
because  in  many  regions  (…)  population  has  out-
grown essential  resources".  Among various methods
identified  by  the  United  Nations  International  Con-
ference  on  Population  and  Development  (ICPD),
September 1994, Cairo, Egypt, and applicable to the
RSS are the: (1) empowerment of women and girls in
the economic, political and social spheres (2) removal
of gender inequalities in education and (3) integration
of  family  planning  in  synergy  with  other  efforts  to
improve  mother  and  child  health  [64].  Poverty  is
perpetuated  and  exacerbated  by  poor  maternal
health,  gender  discrimination  and  lack  of  access  to
birth control. This calls for the need to prioritize the
advancement of human development for women and
for all  victims affected by violence and insecurity as
well as the creation and implementation of a national
strategy  for  human  development  so  as  to  support
peacebuilding  and  its  sustainability,  advance  the
human development process, enhance the needs of
children, the elderly and all victims of conflict ([27] p.
6). Research evidence suggest an inverse relationship
between levels of female education, and birth rate: an
educated woman is more likely to make better use of
existing health care services for both preventive and
curative  health  services,  "to  accept  medical  advice
and to make timely recourse to modern health care
facilities, greater identification with the outside world,
more  social  confidence  at  handling  officials  and
willingness to go out of the home for services" ([65]
p. 20, [66]).
Additionally, sustainable environmental governance
will mitigate the impact of climate change and permit
the government to cope with increasing pressure on
natural resources so as to ensure a sustainable future
for current and returning populations.
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Appendix 1. List of Abbreviations.
CPA Comprehensive Peace Accord
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EFA Education for All
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GoSS Government of South Sudan
HDI Human Development Index
HIV Human immuno virus
ICPD International Conference on Population and Development
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
IPC Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
LPP Liberal Peace Process
LSE London School of Economics
NDI National Democratic Institute
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
PACT Partners Achieving Change together
RSS Republic of South Sudan
SSCCSE South Sudan Centre for Census Statistics and Evaluation
SPLM/A the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army 
TVET Technical and Vocational Education and Training 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UN United Nations
US United States
UNICEF United Nations Children Emergency Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
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